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Botswana, a country with a population slightly over two million, has recently
joined countries that took stringent measures necessary to contain the spread of
COVID-19. On the 31 March 2020 President Dr. Mokgweetsi E. K. Masisi declared
a state of public emergency. This was the second time a state of public emergency
was declared since Botswana attained independence in 1966. According to the
Declaration of State of Public Emergency Order, “…it was necessary to declare
a state of public emergency for the purpose of taking the necessary measured to
address the risks posed by COVID-19”.
President Masisi was acting pursuant to section 17 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Botswana (1966). The features of the said section are that:
1. The President may at any time declare that a state of public emergency exists;
2. In instances where the declaration is made when Parliament is sitting or has
been summoned to sit within a period of seven days, the period for which a
declaration of a state of public emergency shall have effect is a period of seven
days from the date of publication of the declaration;
3. In instances where the declaration is made when Parliament is not sitting, the
period for which a declaration of a state of public emergency shall have effect is
a period of twenty-one days from the date of publication of the declaration. This
period can be extended by Parliament through a resolution passed by a majority
of all the voting members of the National Assembly;
4. The fourth feature of Section 17 is that the National Assembly may not, at any
given time, approve a declaration of a state of public emergency for a period in
excess of six months;
5. The National Assembly may, however, subsequently vote to approve the
declaration of a state of public emergency for further periods of not more than
six months at a time;
6. The last feature of this section is that the state of public emergency that has
been approved by the National Assembly may be revoked by the National
Assembly at any time.
The totality of this section is to the effect that the power to declare a state of
public emergency in Botswana is vested in the President. It is perhaps implicit in
the provision that the section will only be invoked in instances where there is, in
actual fact, a public emergency. To that end, the reasons for the declaration of a
state of public emergency in the two instances a state of public emergency was
declared have varied. The first time that a state of public emergency was declared
in Botswana was when a national elections voter’s roll was set to disenfranchise
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close to a hundred thousand voters who were mistakenly left out of voter’s roll.
President Mogae moved then to declare a state of public emergency so as to correct
the anomaly.
The effect of the declaration of a state of public emergency in any jurisdiction is
known. It is indeed an extreme and extra-ordinary measure that is not common a
feature of peaceful countries like Botswana. In Africa, a declaration of state of public
emergency is usually associated with civil wars and military rule. In essence, once
a President declares a public state of emergency, on the face of it, they could do a
number of things that they are not allowed to do under normal circumstances. As
already highlighted, the declaration of state of public emergency in other countries
has led to colossal violation of rights and suppression of any dissent by those in
power. Perhaps this explains why members of the National Assembly from the
opposition parties strongly objected to President Masisi request for approval of a six
months state of public emergency.
It is important to highlight the manner according to which President Masisi and
the ruling party handled the process of Parliament’s approval of a state of public
emergency. It is indeed commendable that there was an outright acceptance of
the sensitive nature of this process. Also, that this was possibly a measure that
most Batswana would be uncomfortable with, if not properly justified, was properly
considered. The consultation process was done in a very transparent manner and
involved airing the National Assembly proceedings during the debate on the motion
on national television (and this is not a normal occurrence). The President put
forward his reasons for seeking an approval of a period of six months. If one paid
attention to the proceedings of the National Assembly, one thing remained clear;
President Masisi and members of the ruling party wanted to explain, and perhaps
convince, citizens that the period of six months was reasonable considering the
nature of the COVID-19 pandemic.
In reaction to the said motion, members of the opposition parties argued, among
other things, that there was absolutely no need to declare a state of public
emergency. According to them, the current laws, specifically the Public Health Act,
allowed the President to take measures that he wanted to take once a state of public
emergency was declared. They further argued that even if it was to be accepted that
a State of Public Emergency should be declared, it should be for a period of twenty-
eight days commensurate to the period of lockdown already declared. One of their
main concerns was that there was, with no proper oversight, a great possibility of
misuse of state funds and corruption during the period that the President asked for.
Four things that should be highlighted stood out from the said proceedings. Firstly,
both sides of the house agreed that there was a public emergency but differed on
whether it warranted invoking the provisions of section 17 of the Constitution. They
also disagreed on the length of the proposed period of the state of public emergency.
Secondly, members of the opposition parties and those who were opposed to the six
months period sought were concerned with the accountability of the Executive during
this period. This was especially with regards to the government’s procurement and
expenditure during this period. Thirdly, the opposition argued that current laws, or
new laws even, could be used to achieve the very same things the President wanted
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to achieve through a declaration of state of public emergency. In reaction, it was
argued by the ruling party that the Public Health Act and other laws were limited to
the extent the President would not be able to act in a manner that is required of him
when dealing with the pandemic. Finally, there was also concern that the rights of
citizens would be violated during this period.
It is perhaps too early to assess whether the period asked for by President Masisi
was excessive considering that we are yet to witness the measures, and the length
of such measures, that will be put in place to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic.
Likewise, it is too early to assess the validity of the reasons adduced as justification
for the six months period as they are linked to the measures that will be taken during
the state of public emergency to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the
concern raised by the opposition as regards the accountability by the Executive
during and post the state of public emergency has merit. In a country where the
anti-corruption mechanisms are weak and are lacking in many respects, there is
apparent lack of strong supporting domestic legislation such as a law on access to
information, it remains to be seen whether the Executive will be as transparent at the
end of the six months period as it was at beginning.
The debate on the motion, which lasted for two days, ended with a vote in favour of
a state of public emergency period of six months. During this period, the President
is guided, in the exercise of his powers, by the provisions of the Emergency Powers
Act (1966) which primarily allows him to make emergency regulations whenever an
emergency declaration is in force. Such regulations are to be promulgated by the
President but must be approved by the National Assembly in order to have effect.
According to section 3 of the Emergency Powers Act, the President is empowered
to make regulations that appear to him to be necessary for, among others, securing
the public safety. The section is couched in wide terms so as to allow the President
to make such as regulations as may be necessary for dealing with the public
emergency at hand. The section empowers the President to make regulations
restricting the movement of persons, closure of the country’s points of entry, taking
possession of or control, on behalf of the State, any property (other than land) or
undertaking, entering and searching any premises and amendment of any law,
suspension of the operation of such a law and the application of such law with or
without amendments. The President, acting under this section, is prohibited from
making any provision that allows for the trial of persons by military courts.
Section 5 of the Emergency Powers Act creates a safety net by providing that
regulations promulgated by the President under the Act must be approved by
the National Assembly if they are to have effect. The National Assembly can, at
this point, curtail any far reaching and unnecessary powers contained in such
regulations. However, such a safety net is suited for a scenario where the legislature
is completely independent from the Executive. In Botswana members of Cabinet are
voting members of the National Assembly. Furthermore, the history of Botswana’s
Parliament, like many Parliaments in Africa, is that the ruling party often rubber
stamps motions that emanate from the President and his cabinet. Consequently, it is
conceivable that even with the safety net in Section 5 of the Emergency Powers Act,
a President who has ulterior motives can promulgate regulations that are an enabling
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tool for tyranny and simply have his Cabinet and the majority of the ruling party in the
National Assembly rubber stamp them.
In the context of Botswana’s current state of public emergency there has, to date,
been no indication that President Masisi has any ulterior motives. Possibly noting
the extent of the powers vested in him by this provision and the concern from some
quarters about the lack of oversight in the exercise of these powers, President Masisi
has vowed to use these powers solely for dealing with the COVID- 19 pandemic.
Are human rights, specifically constitutional rights, suspended during the State
of Public Emergency? A reading of the provisions of the Emergency Powers Act
(section 4 as read with section 2) reveals that the answer to this question is in
the negative. Granted, the regulations to be adopted by the President under the
Emergency Powers Act supersedes, in the case of any conflict, any enactment.
However, the Constitution is excluded from the definition of an “enactment” under
section 2 of the Emergency Powers Act. This means that constitutional rights are not
suspended during a state of public emergency. That notwithstanding, the limitations
to those rights (as are necessary in an open and democratic society) would still be
applicable. For example, section 5 of the Constitution protects an individual’s right
to personal liberty. Consistent with the preceding point, one’s personal liberty may
be curtailed for the purpose of preventing the spread of an infectious or contagious
disease. A person may thus approach the High Court (which at the moment is only
handling extremely urgent matters) to assert their right to liberty if they allege that
they have been wrongfully arrested. The courts thus remain in operation and citizens
may challenge the application of the regulations already adopted by the President. 
The President has since adopted the Emergency Powers (COVID- 19) Regulations
(2020), which were adopted and came into force on the 2 April 2020. As
aforementioned, they were adopted pursuant to section 3 of the Emergency Powers
Act. A complete assessment of the said regulations is beyond the purview of this
post, however it is only necessary to point out that to date they have only provided
for matters dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic. To date, there are no amendments
to the Regulations that suggests that the President’s powers are being used for
anything other than containing COVID-19.  Whether that will remain the case until
the end of the six months period remains to be seen. For example, regulation 5
allows the President to declare and he thus declared a national lockdown of a
period of 28 days. Further, the Regulations provide for the restriction of movement
within the country, entry into the country as well as matters that are connected with
measures necessary for containing COVID-19. So far, about three (3) people have
been arrested and arraigned on charges of acting contrary to the provisions of the
regulations. They are said to have published (through social media) information that
is likely to deceive the public about COVID-19 or measures taken by Government to
address COVID-19.
Constitutionalism is and speaks to the limits of power, government authority as
well as the legitimacy of the state. Botswana being a constitutional democracy
continues to perform relatively well viz the respect for human rights and the rule of
law. This explains why the process of approving the declaration of state of public
emergency was carried out in accordance with the laid-out law. The issue pertaining
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to the period of the state of emergency appears to me to be a political question
and it possibly now moot. That notwithstanding, a longer or maximum period
should be justified before approval by the National Assembly. Pending an in-depth
assessment of the constitutionality of the Emergency Powers Act, there is no any
other conclusion except to say that once a state of public emergency is declared,
much is dependent on the person occupying the Office of President of the Republic
of Botswana. If he is a good leader, then the country will worry less. The oversight
provided by the Courts at the moment is limited considering that the country has
basically come to a halt. It may improve once the lockdown comes to an end with
only the state of public emergency then being extant. As illustrated above, while in
theory the National Assembly provides sufficient oversight during the state of public
emergency, in practice that might turn out not to be the case.  
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